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5Introduction
In discussions of the future of the state, it is commonly argued or simply
assumed that the role of the nation-state is dramatically diminishing as a
result of economic, cultural and other forms of globalization. The realist
school of international relations, on the other hand, is based on the
proposition that the state and state sovereignty remain the undiminished
nuclei of the international system. Another school of thought stresses the
marked increase of nationalist movements that are striving to become
independent nation-states, especially since the end of the Cold War. An
alternative, more comprehensive approach focuses on the dialectical
interaction of states and multilateral and non-state actors.
What follows is an attempt to clarify and illuminate the emergent
supranational context of contemporary nationalism and the nation-state. Part
1 takes up the consequences and implications of globalization for the future
of the nation-state, national sovereignty, Inter-Governmental Organizations
(IGOs) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). I will also discuss
the upsurge of nationalism and ethno-nationalist movements in the light of
the acceleration of globalization and supranational trends since the end of
the Cold War.  The re-emergence of traditional and new forms of
nationalism pose the question whether or not nation-states today are
becoming more nationalist or, as globalization implies, more multinationalist
and multicultural. I take up this question in relationship to IGOs and their
role in creating new nation-states, in providing increasingly urgent but still
incomplete forms of global governance, and - in collaboration with NGOs -
methods of crisis-management and preventing violent ethno-nationalist
conflicts.
In Part 2, I critically review theories of nationalism and their failure to fully
recognize the larger global and supranational context of nationalism and the
nation-state. I begin with a brief summary of the general problems of this
research field, including the lack of definitional consensus concerning its
6core concepts, such as nation, the nation-state, and nationalism.  This is
followed by a critical analysis of selected theories. I focus on those schools
of thought most relevant to the questions addressed in Part 1, including the
uneven supranationalization of the nation-state, globalization, multiculturali-
zation, and the upsurge in new nationalist movements following the end of
the Cold War. I also take up and critically assess the on-going debate
between ‘modernization’ theorists of nationalism who emphasize the
progressive socio-economic transformation of modern society and theorists
of ethno-nationalism who criticize the premises of the modernization school
and fault its failure to sufficiently recognize the enduring ethnic, pre-modern
components of contemporary nationalisms.
7Part 1
Nation-states and Supranationality
1.1 The transformation of sovereignty
Supranational trends place the nation-state, national movements, and various
other manifestations of “nationalism“ beyond the insularity of purely
national-domestic frames of reference and  activity. Such insularity has
always been, to a greater or lesser extent, an ideological chimera. States and
nation-states by their very nature have been only relatively insular at any
time during their history. They have always existed and have been shaped
by their larger international environment. Nevertheless, the consolidation of
the nation-state and the ideological images and notions of nationalism are
inseparable from inflated notions of such independence.
Supranationalism1 has tended to erode certain norms, prerogatives, and
images of national sovereignty, without however, fundamentally altering the
position of the nation-state as still the single most important actor in the
international system. Yet globalization, deregulation, privatization, and
                                                
1 In this essay I will use the terms supranational organization, Supranational
Organizations (SNOs), and supranationalism to refer to all organizations, institutions
and political and social processes involving more than a single state or at least two
non-state actors from different nation-states. Supranational will thus encompass
formal organizations, institutions, and political and legal agreements related to
transnational interaction. These range from the cross-border movements of people,
commodities, and information (and the agreements and political frameworks that
legitimize and regulate these) to more structured, formalized inter-state activity
organized and supervised by multilateral institutions and organizations, including IGOs.
The broad definition of the term supranational in this essay is akin to the term
transnational but differs from it in that supranational is not intended to focus
primarily on the distinction between the state as an actor in international politics
versus non-state actors acting alone or together with state-actors. The purpose will be
rather to suggest and illustrate the continued decline and the crisis of the independence
of the nation-state both as a political actor and as a justifiable ideological stereotype
and construct.
8related political-economic trends that have become more pronounced since
the end of the Cold War are profoundly affecting contemporary nation-
states and reshaping the cooperation, rivalry and conflict among the various
supranational actors.
The concept of Supranational Organizations (SNOs) reflects the expanding
interaction of non-governmental actors with states, Transnational
Organizations (TNOs), and IGOs.2 As this interaction has increased, it has
                                                
2 Some authors use the term and concept of IGOs interchangeably with International
Organizations (IOs). The term international organization is sometimes used to refer to
the process of international politics structuring itself into cooperative bodies of
various kinds, while International Organizations (IOs) designate formal structures that
arise out of this process (Archer, 1993, 2). The term International Organization (IO)
will be used in this essay as a broad category to refer to IGOs, International Non-
Governmental Organizations (INGOs), and internationally active NGOs. The term
Transnational Organizations (TNOs) will include -- in addition to INGOs and NGOs --
Business INGOs (BINGOs), which are also known as Multinational Enterprises (MNEs),
and Multinational Corporations (MNCs). For a more detailed discussion of the
terminology of IOs, see Archer, 1993; Feld et al, 1994; and Union, 1998.
     IGOs are usually based on international treaties, which formally bind member-states to
uphold the organization’s charter and to pursue its official goal of interstate economic,
political, security, or cultural cooperation. IGOs are most notably distinguished by their
institutional framework, which varies according to the IGO’s purpose, its area of
activity, the size of its membership, the geopolitical constraints under which it has to
operate, and the specific nation-states that comprise it.
IGOs are comprised not only of sovereign nation-states (i.e., governments in the strict
sense of the term) but also IGOs, which are represented with nameplates and have
voting rights. A number of European IGOs also include in their family of institutions
parliamentary assemblies, in which the national, elected political parties of each
member-state are represented. Examples include the European Union (EU), the
Council of Europe (COE), the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO), and the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The Union of
International Associations in their standard reference work provides data on
“federations of international organizations,“ “universal membership organizations,“
“intercontinental membership organizations,“ and “regionally oriented membership
organizations“ (Union, 1998). Under the rubric “other international bodies“ are
“organizations emanating from places or persons or other bodies,“  “organizations of
special form,“ and “internationally oriented national organizations.“ The UN bases its
relatively broad definition of an IO on whether or not the organization was established
by an agreement among governments. When this is not the case, the organization is
considered by the UN as a NGO (Union, 1998, 1761). The general, relatively
unspecified criteria of the UN definition of different types of organizations are not
universally accepted, especially regarding the classification of NGOs. For more detailed
and systematic criteria for defining and classifying NGOs that more accurately reflect
their explosive growth in recent years, see Union (1998) and earlier editions of this
9tended to shift and perforate the boundaries separating the realm of
government and states from non-governmental actors and institutions.
IGOs, while primarily defined and controlled by states, have become
inseparable from and dependent on NGOs.
Apart from states acting alone or in concert, IGOs stand at the high end of
the scale of politically structured cooperation. In terms of functional
competence, resources, legal authority, and political power in international
relations, IGOs are the most important multilateral actors in the international
community.3
The relationship of nation-states to IGOs is sometimes sovereignty-
enhancing, sometimes sovereignty-limiting. Whether it is one or the other
depends partly on one’s definition of sovereignty. It is often overlooked that
a state can often enhance its sovereignty through the agency of an IGO and
the collective action of an IGO or coalition of IGOs. The decisions and
actions of an IGO may express the general, collective interest of all its
member-states, but nevertheless at the same time benefit some of its
members more than others. Major powers, hegemonial states, and
                                                                                                                                                
valuable resource.
3 The term international community will be used in this essay to refer to international
organizations, multilateral institutions, INGOs, states, and national publics. In its
current political and international legal context, the term international community is
not free from ambiguity. As a result of the end of the East-West conflict, the term is
becoming synonymous with values that are often considered or taken for granted as
“universal“ but are Western in their origin and contemporary meaning, including
democracy, rule of law, and human rights. The international community can also refer
to the collective of nations, within which there are non-democratic regimes that do
not subscribe to the corpus of “Western“ values. Another ambiguity of the term
international community is linked to those actors in international politics who are
present by virtue of their exclusion, namely, refugees, who now number 13.2 million
people (State of the World Refugees, 1997) and whose numbers are still growing.
Condemned to live and migrate in a world of nation-states to which they do not
officially belong, these stateless communities and individuals tend to receive greater
political recognition and consideration of their plight in the universe of IGO and
NGOs, than they do within individual states. Notwithstanding these ambiguities, for the
sake of simplicity I will use the term international community in this essay in all the
above senses and rely on the context to make clear my meaning in each instance.
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superpowers can and do use IGOs as instruments to implement their
national policies.
National governments are obliged to adopt domestic policies that are
formally in accord with treaties and agreements of the IGOs in which they
participate. Yet the international judicial system is not equipped with
monitoring and implementation mechanisms to prevent or rectify most
violations of this formal norm of international politics and law.
Executive governments also use their nation’s international agreements and
IGO commitments to promote the passage of domestic draft legislation.
International commitments to IGO agreements are sometimes invoked to
gain domestic popular and legislative approval, especially in the case of
unpopular policies. During the Cold War the notion of “NATO alliance
commitments“ was often put forth by successive US administrations that
sought approval of foreign military budgetary outlays. European govern-
ments similarly invoke “Brussels“ (the inter-governmental headquarters of
the EU) to explain and justify unpopular austerity policies to their publics.
The actual breath and scope of state sovereignty, either past or present,
should not, however, be overemphasized. It is often falsely assumed, as
Holton reminds us, that there was a golden age when states exercised
absolute control over their territory and the movement of people and
resources across their territory (Holton, 1998, 83). The sovereignty of
nation-states has always been conditioned by a variety of limiting factors.
These include recognition by other states, the degree of development and
integration of the international system, and the types of control that any
centralized government administratively and in other ways is able to
exercise over its territory and its population.
Today, nation-states are less independent and sovereign than they were in
former times prior to the proliferation of IGOs, NGOs and other SNOs.
The nature and limits of state sovereignty are being transformed from
11
“above“ by SNOs (sometimes by coalitions of IGOs and NGOs) and from
“below“ by NGOs and grassroots movements whose demands are in part
transmitted by domestic lobbies and NGOs. While the distinction of politics
from “below“ and from “above“ is useful, it is also problematic to the
extent, as already discussed, that IGOs work together with NGOs. This
activity on the part of NGOs extends from promoting the demands of
grassroots movements within IGOs to providing UN weapon inspectors in
Iraq following the Gulf War. Coalitions of IGOs and NGOs help to nurture
civil-societal movements for greater democracy and human rights in post-
communist societies. NGOs also ally with individual states in IGOs in order
to criticize particular member-states that fail to meet their international
obligations and violate international humanitarian law. Coalitions of this kind
have become a recognized part of international politics, although they
attenuate and violate the traditional notion of state sovereignty and the
principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states.
States jealously guard their sovereignty as nation-states. But as a result of
the growth and integration of the international economy their sovereignty
has become politically and economically more mediated by the sovereignty
of other states and by IGOs. States have become weaker in their capability
to act unilaterally but “stronger“ in their capability to act regionally and
globally through various forms of collective action. Such action can have a
net effect on their power and influence as “independent“ states. It affects
their domestic legitimacy and also impacts on different kinds and
dimensions of nationalist sentiment and nationalist movements.
1.2 Globalization and “glocalization“
The traditional paradigm of state sovereignty has a strongly “spatial,“
territorial bias. The territory of a nation-state tends to mark the accepted
boundary separating internal and external affairs. Globalization tends to “de-
spatialize“ the notion of sovereignty by merging what is internal and
external, making it difficult or impossible to cleanly separate the two. In the
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case of the EU, the boundaries that circumscribe national and European
policy have been eroded -- in some cases eliminated -- by the progress of
the European unification. Robertson’s useful concept and term “glocaliza-
tion“ attempts to theoretically capture the inter-penetration of the local and
global and how they co-determine each other (Robertson, 1995). 
As IGOs and other inter-state SNOs play a larger role in domestic and
global policymaking and policy implementation, the distinction between
domestic issues and extra-domestic affairs of state, including regional and
global issues, becomes less clear. International legal and political commit-
ments pertaining to human rights, environmental protection, health, crime,
commerce, labor practices, intellectual property, and scinetific research co-
determine domestic policies today.
Global problems, such as the ecological challenges of the abused biosphere,
the worldwide health effects of exponentially increasing social interactivity,
including changing dynamics of epidemics, pandemics, and other health
risks, are examples of the challenges that states perceive first as domestic
threats. But they recognize that they have a vital interest in combating such
problems collectively. IGOs provide relatively stable, accessible multilateral
frameworks for cooperative dialogue, decisionmaking, and decision-
implementation for coordinated common action.
Globalization has also attenuated the social and cultural dimensions of state
sovereignty of modern nation-states by making culturally relatively
homogeneous polities more multicultural and multilingual, notwithstanding
reluctance of many governments to formally recognize such changes. This
process places states in greater social-cultural proximity to one another.
The separation from the nationally, culturally “other“ is radically reduced
because of the expanding multicultural, multinational mix in one’s own
country.
1.3 The creation of nation-states and IGOs
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Nation-states create IGOs, and the establishment of new nation-states
presupposes their recognition by IGOs. IGOs and other SNOs actively
assist in establishing new nation-states.4 IGOs also establish new IGOs and
other types of SNOs. Increasingly this activity includes establishing
organizations to promote the creation and funding of NGOs.  The UN
family of IGOs and other international bodies is the most important example
of this process. Other examples include Europe’s regional IGOs, such as
the OSCE, COE, EU, and NATO.
While some IGOs were set up by states before the heyday of modern
nation-state nationalism (after 1830), IGOs only assumed an important
historical role with the predominance of the nation-state in international
politics. The increase of nation-states, especially since the end of World
War II, has continued to generate the need for additional and new kinds of
IGOs, NGOs, and other SNOs.
During the post-World-War-II era, the UN played a key role in the transition
of anti-colonial, nationalist movements into independent nation-states,
particularly in Africa and Asia. Following the Cold War, complex formal
and informal coalitions of IGOs and other SNOs have helped to midwife the
Newly Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet empire. Among the
twenty-seven new states that joined the UN between 1990 and 1995 many
were ex-Soviet republics.
1.4 IGOs, nationalist movements, and nationally defined sovereignty
The international system today is comprised of interlocking networks of
                                                
4 he creation of new states as a broad global trend is reflected in the increasing
percentage of the world’s peoples that are represented in major IGOs, most
importantly, the UN. In 1969, 75% of the world’s peoples were represented in the
UN. By 1994, the UN represented 99.9% of the world’s peoples (Commission on
Global Governance, 1995, 8).
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IGOs, NGOs, and other SNOs. IGOs are mutually linked through
overlapping memberships, formal and informal inter-organizational
consultation at the
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diplomatic, expert, and inter-personal levels, and through cooperation in
field operations.
The complex interaction of states, IGOs, NGOs and other SNOs has
become a political environment in which ethnic and religious groups,
national minorities, and linguistic communities demand greater recognition
and often different forms of self-determination. Such movements, many of
which espouse nationalist aims, agitate politically for support of their claims
at the local and national level, and increasingly in IGOs and other multilateral
bodies. Nationalist movements today often ally with INGOs or, as already
mentioned, become themselves transnational movements active in IGOs and
other SNOs. Such activity is an example of the “glocalization“ of nationalist
movements and nationalist phenomena and the supranational context of
nationalist movements today.  The struggle for independence in Kosovo in
Serbia is a good example of a multi-leveled conflict unfolding both locally
and nationally in the state of Serbia (which is defending its sovereignty
claim over the mountainous enclave), in Albania, and throughout the
Balkans. At the regional and global level, NATO, the EU, the OSCE, the UN,
and the Contact Group of major powers have intervened in the name of
international security in order to promote a peaceful solution to the conflict.
States conduct an increasing amount of their extra-domestic policymaking
through the mediation of IGOs and networks of IGOs and other SNOs.
Bilateral and multilateral state activity (outside of IGOs) as a rule is
supposed to conform to the state’s international obligations and agreements,
although this is often not the case. The increased weight of IGOs and other
SNOs tends to attenuate the national framework of state legitimacy by
“bonding it“ in specific, carefully spelled-out, delimited ways with the
sovereignty of other national states through international norms, rules,
treaties, and cooperative activities. When a nation-state signs on to an
international human-rights political agreement or a legally binding treaty, its
legitimacy as a nation-state is no longer only based on its national
sovereignty but also linked to the governments and citizens of other nation-
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states. These other polities are also signatories of the document. Their
citizens may even look to other nation-states to help safeguard their rights
as individuals and members of their nationally defined society and as
members of an supranationally evolving, albeit still only embryonic global,
civil society.
The greatly expanded intervention-type activities of the UN Security Council
following the end of the Cold War are cited by Feld as an example of the
erosion of the traditional principle of national political sovereignty and
jurisdiction (Feld et al. 1994, 5). Specific examples include the Security
Council’s work in peacekeeping, peacemaking, and post-conflict
rehabilitation (Armstrong, 1996, 125-131).
Another example is the post-Cold-War OSCE. If a crisis or conflict within a
member-state is deemed to threaten regional stability and security, the
OSCE can decide to take action against the state (Lucas, 1995d). Such
intervention is also a departure from the rule of non-interference by states in
the internal affairs of other states.
Major interventions by IGOs in inter- and infra-state conflicts have failed to
prevent their escalation into military violence and the mass killing of
civilians. The armed conflicts in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s,
in Rwanda in 1994, and in Kosovo in 1998 are examples. The international
machinery for timely conflict prevention and conflict cessation is still too
constrained by the rules and political culture of national state sovereignty to
prevent instability, war, and gross violations of international and humanitar-
ian law. Even the genocide of 800,000 Tutsi in Rwanda and neighboring
states in East Africa in late 1994 was allowed to continue while the
international community stood by (Gourevitch, 1998).
Although the formal possibility of limited intervention in a conflict may
exist, IGOs often fail to muster the political will of their member-states to
make full use of the procedures and instruments at their disposal. In some
17
cases, the constraints of sovereignty rules and bureaucratic inertia, which
such constraints tend to create, combine with organizational and logistical
weaknesses. This was the case when the UN failed to intervene to prevent
the Rwandan genocide.  The failure of the international community to
intervene following Russia’s military intervention in Chechnyna in
December, 1994, despite Moscow’s gross violations of its OSCE
obligations, is also an example (Lucas, 1996, 1998). Moscow was able to
maintain that the conflict was an internal Russian affair, which was
officially accepted by the United States and other major powers. Although
the OSCE did send a mission to Chechnya, which was nevertheless
unprecedented in the case of Russia, the OSCE diplomats could not halt the
massive destruction that took place.
1.5 Multiculturalism and post-modernist social-political reform
As the structure and dynamics of nation-states become increasingly
mediated by inter-state and inter-societal relationships, legitimacy tends to
take on supranational dimensions. The terms “modernity“ and “moderniza-
tion“ are used to conceptualize the industrial transformation and political-
economic consolidation of the modern nation-state. They are core concepts
of the “modernization“ school of theorists of nationalism, which will be
discussed in greater detail in Part 2. Building on this terminology for our
purposes here, we can use the term post-modern to capture a number of the
emerging supranational dimensions of the nation-state. While post-modern
forms of legitimacy and state behavior develop within the traditional
“modern“ nation-state, they also conflict with a number of its characteris-
tics and values. A locus and manifestation of this conflict is multicultural-
ism.
The social and cultural basis of the modern nation-state is unevenly
becoming multiculturalized. At play here are the “bottom-up“ dynamics of
grassroots social and political movements and the “top-down“ acts of
institutionalization and legitimation by the state. Through national legislation
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and policymaking, the state is under pressure to recognize the demands of a
new diversity of cultural, ethnic, gender and other politicized groups
(having different nationalities) for recognition, social protection, and
economic enfranchisement. Globalization and its wide-ranging conse-
quences have accelerated the multiculturalization of national politics. The
incessant movements of people (migration, tourism, etc.,) across different
national borders has exponentially increased. These flows have also put into
question many of the traditional cultural, communication, and other
boundaries linked to respective nation-states. Migration movements tend to
flow in the direction of relatively more open and prosperous, democratic
nation-states. These act as economic and cultural magnets for other
nationalities and create cultural hubs that reflect and project through global
channels of communication and culture new values reflecting these
changes. Historical and cultural images of the past, present, and future tend
to be brought together in  kaleidoscopic “recombinations“ that generate a
“glocalized“ sense of time and space.
“Multiculturalism“ as a term is often used to refer to the differentiation of
rivaling, polarized groups in the trenches of on-going “culture wars.“ Yet
multiculturalism also refers to eclectic mixtures and cross-cultural patterns
in everyday lifestyle, art, fashion, religious practice and politics that
stimulate and reflect a more profound, more richly colored and nuanced
model of cultural and political pluralism. It is based on more pronounced
forms of individualism and group particularism made possible, somewhat
paradoxically, by a greater freedom and tolerance anchored politically and
legally within the international community and states, IGOs, and other
SNOs.
These forms of post-modernization also produce a violent backlash of
religious, cultural and politically independent groups, communities, and even
states that see their traditional way of life and beliefs threatened by
disruption and possible destruction by outside forces over which they feel
they have no control. This backlash includes religious-based or religious-
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clothed extremism of the fundamentalist type that does not know how to
deal with post-modernist change and rejects politics for campaigns of
violence and building terrorist TNOs.
Multiculturalism promotes supranational thinking and doing by undermining
the ideal of one homogeneous national political culture emblematized
through highly unified national symbols characteristic of the traditional,
modern nation-state. Part 2 of this essay will discuss this point further in
the context of theories of nationalism.
1.6 The dialectic of modernism and post-modernist reform
1.6.1 Premises of the modern state and multiculturalism
Social and political multiculturalization has become unmistakably evident
today in the changing policies, self-representation, and values of the nation-
state as a subject of international politics. The supranational dynamics of
globalization pressure individual states to recognize, despite their reluctance
in this regard, the extent to which the composition of their respective
populations and thus also their “national culture“ has become (or always
was) multicultural and multinational.
Multiculturalization erodes some of the basic premises of nation-state
formation and national unification that became entrenched in the interna-
tional system in the heydays of 17th, 18th and 19th century nationalism.
These include the fundamental aim of creating centralized, more or less
exclusionist national cultures, a highly unified, externally protected territorial
space, homogenized national symbols out of pre-given, diverse cultural
elements, and in not a few cases, national or quasi-national religions. These
goals were often pursued by campaigns of discrimination, exclusion, and
sometimes expropriation by the embryonic central governmental authorities
against minority, ethnic, cultural, and religious groups (Zollberg, 1983).
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This historical construction of the real and imagined (i.e. ideological)
community of the nation-state was often contradicted by facts on the
ground. The violence of nation-state construction was also softened and
mitigated by the maturation of liberal constitutional democracies.
Nevertheless, the ideological oversimplifications of nation-building and
campaigns of expropriation are inseparable from the modernization project
that was concomitant with the early rise of capitalism, its conquest of the
world, and its spread of the nation-state form. Its extension through the
competitive, imperialist conquest of the Americas, Africa and Asia
culminated in the 19th century and  led to the series of inter-imperialist wars
in the historical run-up to World War I.
1.6.2 Nation-state formation in the ex-Soviet space
One of capitalism’s historic, 20th century triumphs was the titanic downfall
of Soviet communism and the first break-through steps in the integration of
ex-Soviet states and China into the multinational and multicultural networks
of capitalist production, distribution, and consumption. This albeit crisis-
ridden, uneven process of integration is being facilitated with the help of
IGOs and other SNOs and is promoting the creation of additional
supranational bodies and networks.
The end of the Cold War abolished much of the traditional insularity of
former communist states. The integration of these newly independent
regimes into the international community of states, IGOs and other SNOs
has entailed two overlapping and partially contradictory processes. Firstly,
new states have emerged that are based on traditional, modernist-type
nationalism of nation-statehood. Secondly, a post-modernist process of
supranational multiculturalization has tended to put into question many of
the political and political-cultural traits and constraints of traditional, unitary
nation-statehood.
In ex-communist, newly independent states, national governments are
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confronted with the task of designing policies and development-paths that
forge a compromise between the modernist and post-modernist, suprana-
tionalist projects. This is not easy due to the fact that these two approaches
are at odds with each other. States that prioritize the modernist, ideologi-
cally dominant traits of nation-statehood to the exclusion of multicultural
openness and pluralist political culture will tend to exclude themselves from
the rapidly evolving “glocalized“ environment in which all nation-states
increasingly find themselves. But the modern nation-state cannot truly open
itself to its post-modern social and cultural environment without becoming
self-critical of its traditional historical heritage and its own history of
discrimination against “foreign“ and minority cultures.
The clash of these two political cultures forms a major source of political
instability and the breakdown of nation-state order into ethno-nationalist
conflict and civil war in states, such as the former Yugoslavia since the
early 1990s and in Russia (for example, in its internal war with Chechnya).
The lack of a democratic, pluralist political culture under communism ill-
equipped both the former Yugoslavia and ex-Soviet Russia to deal with the
double political culture shock of modern nation-state formation and post-
modernist transition. Modernism is based on democratic institutions and
values. Post-modernism requires not only democracy but also greater
openness of the state toward notions of decentralization, devolution,
subsidiarity, the granting of different degrees and types of autonomy to
sub-national groupings that are demanding ethnic-political recognition,
social protection, and cultural or ethnic legitimation. The newly independent
states throughout the ex-Soviet space are doubly challenged by having been
thrust into modernist and post-modernist, supranationalist transition
simultaneously as a result of the end of communism.
The clash of the modernist and post-modernist transition is not confined to
the newly independent states. As a result of globalization, this antagonism is
being played out throughout the world. To different degrees, minority and
multicultural social movements and trends have placed all central
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governments under pressure to become self-critical of their traditionally
narrowly defined national heritage. This self-questioning often concerns the
role of historically dominant elites in discriminating against and suppressing
minority cultures, social groups, and whole peoples whose cultures were
often quite literally “smelted down“ in the crucibles of national unification.
The nationalist movements and conflicts today, including the ethno-national
wars in post-communist Europe, the claims of native peoples and other
social and ethnic groups throughout the world are challenging the traditional
state, IGOs and other SNOs in their struggle to adjust to latter-day
modernist and post-modernist trends. Politically neglected social-political
constituencies are now demanding more loudly than formerly their basic
human rights, political enfranchisement, and in many cases the restitution of
individual and collective property wrested from them in past historical
epochs.
1.7 IGOs, NGOs, and nationalist movements
Virtually all the areas of activity of IGOs and NGOs impact nationalist
movements directly or indirectly. Among the more important types of long-
term projects that contribute to reducing infra- and inter-state nationalism
are the following:
- promoting the rule of law and human rights
- fostering civil society and democracy in newly independent states
- promoting international understanding
- helping to establish cooperation and education infrastructures
- acilitating and organizing economic assistance
- combating regional and global problems.
IGOs, NGOs, and other SNOs also act as forums or mediators for dialogue
and negotiation of disputes between nationalist opposition movements or
ethnic groups and individual states.
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The dialogue-promoting and mediating activity of IGOs also occurs within
organizations whose members include politically and militarily allied states.
NATO, as a collective defense organization, is a good example. During the
history of the alliance, Greece and Turkey, both of whom are members,
have fallen into disputes that have threatened their peaceful bilateral relations
and thus also the cohesion of the NATO alliance. These differences were
peacefully managed as a result of their common alliance membership, their
commitment to their alliance obligations, and the pressure and persuasion of
other alliance members. NATO is an example of a specialized type of IGO,
in which its traditional member-states and their respective military
establishment have learned as a result of a half-century of experience to
work together. Political disputes among NATO’s members, some of which
are nationalist in nature, have been in most cases subdued in the larger
interest and goals of political-military cooperation, regional security, and
stability.
IGOs and NGOs also provide humanitarian support for the civilian victims
of wars and crises, including refugees and internally displaced persons.
Once peace is established, IGOs and NGOs often provide resources for
post-conflict reconstruction. Such aid can play a significant role in helping
to stabilize peace and prevent a resurgence of tension and war.
With the downfall of Soviet Communism, the end of the East-West division
of the world, and the eruption of ethno-nationalist movements throughout
the East, a number of IGOs have adopted innovatory interventionary
procedures. These have gone beyond the former limits imposed by the
principle of non-intervention in the “internal affairs“ of nation-states. What
is accepted by the international community as “internal“ to a particular state
has changed, most importantly in situations in which an internal conflict can
ignite a crisis or conflict in the surrounding (sub-)region or even globally.
Different types of IGOs and NGOs, often cooperating or acting in concert,
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have been engaged in the former Yugoslavia and other parts of the Balkans,
initiating projects in order to ease tensions, implement peace agreements,
and promote post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction.
The challenges for the international community and the networks of IGOs
and NGOs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Serbia,
and Albania have been a test case for the international community. The
problems that they have had to deal with have also functioned as a catalyst
of needed reform within major IGOs.
The international community was unable to prevent the wars in former
Yugoslavia, the conflicts in ex-Soviet republics, including those in Nagorno-
Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, to name several of the more
familiar examples. But the major powers working with IGOs and other
SNOs were effective at preventing such “hot spots“ from igniting a chain
reaction of widening war. Contrary to fears that were prevalent in the early
1990s, these conflicts have been tentatively contained, though not fully
settled. They have remained local hot or cold wars. In some cases, the
danger of their widening beyond their present boundaries remains very real,
as in Kosovo, Macedonia, Bosnia, and venues in the former Soviet Union.
The ex-Soviet republics provide examples of inter-ethnic tension between
Russian minorities in the new former Soviet republics and the newly
enfranchised majorities. In the Baltic states, the Russian minority under
Soviet rule enjoyed a privileged social, political, and economic position.
They lost many of their privileges and former status when the Soviet Union
was dissolved and Estonia, Lithuania, and Letland became independent.
Tensions between the Russian minorities and the majority national
population became a source of  brewing conflict between the respective
Baltic states and Moscow. Problems of citizenship, pensions, jobs, and
language requirements became the subject of acrimonious national political
debate. Russia defended Russians in the Baltics who, Moscow insisted, had
become the object of political, economic and social discrimination. The
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OSCE, the COE and a number of other SNOs played a major role in
advising Baltic governments on new legislation concerning these issues and
in effect mediating between Moscow and the Baltic capitals. The OSCE
High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) is a post that was
created in 1992 within the OSCE expressly for such interventions (Brett,
1993; Lucas, 1995d). Many of these missions, supplemented by work of
NGOs, were successful in helping to prevent more serious conflicts.
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Part 2
Nationalism
2.1 Competing theoretical approaches
John Breuilly reminds us that nationalism is the most important political
ideology of the modern era but also one which elicits the least agreement
(Breuilly, 1996, 137). Breuilly’s judgement is one of the few propositions
about which most theorists of nationalism would concur. Theories of
nationalism are often introduced by their authors with a discussion of the
plethora of theories, definitions, and terms, and the elusiveness of arriving
at a systematic approach to this troubled research field. For Breuilly, the
explanation of the lack of consensus begins with the many angles from
which nationalism can be theoretically and empirically investigated.5 A
second source of his dissatisfaction is the often-encountered failure in the
vast literature of nationalism to find clearer distinctions between national-
ism, nations, the nation-state, and national unity. There is, in addition, the
“gulf between those who regard nationalism as the product, however
exaggerated or distorted a form, of an underlying national reality, and those
who regard it as myth, the cause rather than the product of nationality“
(ibid.). A similarly troublesome divide separates those who view the nation
as a political association and those who see it as a cultural community.
                                                
5 The list of different types of nationalism of the political scientist Max Sylvius
Handman illustrates the tendency to differentiate and even define nationalisms in
terms of a variety of political phenomena. Handman’s nominally generous list include
“oppression nationalism,“ “irredentist nationalism,“ “conscious nationalism,“
“subconscious nationalism,“ “hegemony nationalism,“ “particularistic nationalism,“
“marginal nationalism,“ and “nationalities in the minorities“ (Handman, 1921, cited in
Snyder, 1976, 32-33).
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2.2 Classifications of theories of nationalism
Breuilly also points to the universality and the power of nationalism, its vast
range of cases and abundance of vested interests, which make concurrence
in the ways of looking at nationalism a dim prospect. In addition,
methodological problems plague the field, because nationalism combines
descriptive and prescriptive claims6 The result is a large output of new
literature on nationalism that annually enlarges the field without diminishing
the problem.
In his general classification of approaches to nationalism Breilly distin-
guishes the following:7
1. Particular histories of particular nationalisms;
2. General histories that see nationalism as an aspect of modernity and
the making of modern times;
3. General historical approaches that view nationalism as a political
expression of the emergence of nations and relate different national-
isms to the different types of nations; and
4. Studies that seek to go beneath the surface of nationalism to discover
the underlying reality which is responsible for nationalism, which
might be modern forms of class conflict, psychological losses of
identity brought about by the erosion of tradition, or the needs of
modernization and the development of new forms and patterns of
communication and culture.
                                                
6 Stuart Woolf defines national identity as “an abstract concept that sums up the
collective expression of a subjective individual sense of belonging to a socio-political
unit: the nation state“ (Woolf, 1996, 26). He goes on to point out: “Nationalist
rhetoric assumes not only that individuals form part of a nation (through language,
blood, choice, residence, or some other criterion), but that they identify with the
territorial unit of the nation state. Such an affirmation is ideological, in that it
describes as a reality an ideal relationship that nationalists wish to express“ (ibid.).
7 For comparable classifications of approaches to nationalism, see in particular Smith
(1983) who attempts a systematic overview and critical analysis of the different
theories of nationalism.  See also Snyder (1976) who belongs to an earlier generation
of theorists.
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James Goodman provides a classification of five broad categories of
theories of nationalism useful for focusing on contemporary debates.  He
distinguishes the following approaches (Goodman, 1996, 13-33):
1. ‘Ethno-national’ theories that stress the ethnic components of
nationalism and attempt to explain the affective, subjective power of
nationalism;
2. Modernization theories, which emphasize the role of socio-economic
factors in the emergence of national identity, most importantly indus-
trialization;
3. ‘State-centered’ theories that link nationalism to the state system and
international relations;
4. ‘Class-centered’ theories, which relate class relations and the impact
of industrial capitalism on nationalist movements; and
5. ‘Uneven development’ theories, which focus on the wider international
and transnational setting in which nationalism is reproduced and which
integrate a broad range of economic, cultural, and political relation-
ships within and between societies.8
2.3 Problems of defining nationalism
Louis Snyder provides the following detailed definition of nationalism based
on the characteristics of the modern nation-state:
 “that sentiment of a group or body of people living within a compact or a
noncontiguous territory using a single language or related dialects as a
vehicle for common thoughts and feelings, holding a common religious
                                                
8 Goodman uses Anthony Smith as an example of ethno-national theories and Karl
Deutsch and Ernest Gellner as exponents of the modernist school. For the state-
centered approach, John Breuilly is briefly summarized.  Eric Hobsbawm, Samir Amin,
and Jim Blaut  represent the ‘class-centered’ theories of nationalism of oppressed
classes. Under ‘uneven development theories,’ to which Goodman devotes the most
atttention, are grouped Benedict Anderson, Charles Tilly, Miroslav Hroch, and Tom
Nairn.
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belief, possessing common institutions, traditions, and customs acquired
and transmitted during the course of a common history, venerating national
heroes, and cherishing a common will for social homogeneity“ (Snyder,
1976, 25).
Snyder warns students of nationalism about his highly composite
definition.9 He emphasizes the varieties of nationalism, its changing
character and the insurmountable difficulties of giving it a precise,
satisfying definition. He cautions his reader that any one of the individual
elements that he attributes to nationalism in his definition may be lacking
without affecting its validity. Nationalism, he then adds, with an almost
Dante-esque resignation not uncommon in the field, is surrounded by “a
thick, almost impenetrable intellectual smog,“ suffused with “paradox,
inconsistency, and contradiction“ (ibid., 3).10
In his over-all approach, Snyder stresses nationalism’s psychological roots,
its link to the need of human beings for security, and, on the more objective
side, nationalism’s complex combinations of political, economic, social or
cultural elements.
Nationalism is a historical chameleon. It takes on different characteristics
depending on the historical period under investigation. It proclaims
liberalism and democracy at one moment only to turn into a mobilizing
force and justification of authoritarianism and totalitarianism the next. In our
contemporary world of competing nationalisms, these two general types
                                                
9 See Hobsbawm, 1992, Chapter 1, for a brief history of how terms, such as “nation,“
“people,“ “homeland,“ etc., gradually assumed their modern meanings and association
with nationalism.
10 Hobsbawm notes in a similar vein that there are no satisfactory criteria for answering
the question, what is a nation? He remarks that “there is no way of telling the observer
how to distinguish a nation from other entities a priori, as we can tell him or her how
to recognize a bird or distinguish a mouse from a lizard. Nation-watching would be
simple if it could be like bird-watching“ (1992, 5). Hobsbawm elaborates his point by
critically looking at common objective and subjective criteria for defining a nation,
including language, ethnicity, and subjective claims by individuals or groups.
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co-exist within and between states.  This competition has intensified since
the end of the Cold War and impacts and is impacted by supranational
organization. The conflicts between different liberal and illiberal, state and
sub-state, irredentist and multi-ethnic nationalisms are important dimensions
of the debates both among theorists of nationalism and within diplomatic
and expert circles in IGOs. Many IGOs and NGOs deal with conflicts
between nationalist movements and nation-states on a daily basis.
2.4 Small- and large-state nationalism
For historian Eric Hobsbawm, nationalism is a historically changing entity,
but belongs “to a particular, and historically recent, period“ and is related to
“a certain kind of modern territorial state, the ‘nation-state’“ (1992, 10).
Hobsbawm’s work is particularly valuable in placing post-Cold War ethnic
nationalisms into historical perspective.
Hobsbawm argues that the type of self-determination nationalism
fashionable today is based on what he calls the “Wilsonian-Leninist notion“
that triumphed with the Treaty of Versailles at the end of World War I. 
Enshrined in the treaty is the notion that independent statehood was a
rightful claim of peoples demanding self-determination. The motto, “every
ethnicity, every nationality, a state“ expresses the essence of this model of
self-determination. Giuseppe Mazzini, the 19th century champion of Italian
nationalism, is historically credited with this slogan, although not altogether
correctly, as Hobsbawm shows. Yet, it pithily expresses the program of
many of the ethno-nationalist movements that have erupted since the end of
the Cold War whose goals have been to become nation-states, the most
prized form of self-determination.
Hobsbawm emphasizes that nationalism as an ideology dates from the
period of 18th and 19th century bourgeois liberalism. The nation-state
developed in a world of multilingual, multicultural pre- and “proto-national“
entities that evolved into nation-states. Liberal bourgeois nationalist
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movements resulted in the large modern nation-states, and their formation
often involved the assimilation or suppression of minority religious,
linguistic and ethnic groups.
Hobsbawm also distinguishes between the classic nation-building
nationalism of the period 1830-1870 and the nationalism between 1870 and
1914. In the earlier period, the principle of nationality was applied by
Mazzini and other leading representatives of nationalist movements to
would-be nations of a certain size (Hobsbawm, 1992, 31). This ‘threshold
principle’ was based on the economic advantages of large, national units (a
major justification for the formation of liberal states in the first place).
Smaller nationalities, which would not have qualified as potential nations,
would have included Sicilians, Bretons, Welsh and even the Irish. The large
nation-states envisioned would have been comprised of different
nationalities and were thus conceived as ‘multi-national’ (ibid., 32). 
Building nations was also viewed at that time as a process of expansion and
unification based on the idea that social evolution “expanded the scale of
human social units from family and tribe to county and canton, from the
local to the regional, the national and eventually the global“ (ibid., 33). On
this model, not only would all Greeks or Italians or Germans come together
in one state but also Serbs would merge with Croats into a single
Yugoslavia and Czechs with Slovaks. Poles would combine with
Lithuanians and Ruthenes. Multi-ethnic, multilingual, and multinational
forms of interaction were understood as characteristics of these nation-
states and the older, Western European nation-states, such as Britain,
France, and Spain.
It was thus also widely accepted during the classical phase of nation-state
formation that not all nationalities were destined to become states. In
addition to the territorial ‘threshold principle,’ there were, according
Hobsbawm, three criteria which allowed a people to be firmly classed as a
state. The first was their historic association with a current state or one
with a lengthy and recent past. The second was the existence of a long-
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established cultural elite possessing a written national literary and
administrative vernacular. The third criterium was a proven capacity for
conquest.
Hobsbawm uses his historical survey of the classical period of liberal
bourgeois nationalism and the formation of the liberal state to criticize the
notion of pure nation-states in which the ‘nation’ or ethnically homogenous
dominant group is co-extensive with the national territory. While this notion
defines abstractly what the ‘nation-state’ is supposed to be, it has existed in
practice, as most theorists of nationalism agree, very rarely. As an ideology,
however, this notion of the nation-state has served as a hot-house for
inflated notions of self-determination for sundry peoples and ethnic groups.
It has also been a potent ideological fertilizer for the excesses of racist and
xenophobic nationalism, which is also one of Hobsbawm’s main concerns
in his historical account. He argues that ethnically homogenous states did
not really exist in the 19th century, and ethnically pure states are not
possible today, despite the efforts at different forms of ‘ethnic cleansing’
and ‘unmixing of peoples.’ Citing urbanization and industrialization, the
massive movements and transfers of people across borders and continents,
he reiterates the point that such forces undermine “the basic nationalist
assumption of a territory inhabited essentially by an ethnically, culturally and
linguistically homogeneous population.  “[T]oday the typical ‘national
minority’ in most countries receiving migration is an archipelago of small
islands rather than a coherent land-mass“ (Hobsbawm, 1992, 157). 
Hobsbawm’s critique hammers home the conclusion that self-
determination-nationalism according to the motto “every ethnicity, every
nationality, a state“ is not a viable option for respective ethnicities
demanding greater recognition and political legitimacy. Hobsbawm predicts
that the type of nationalism on which such demands are based is unlikely to
play a major role in determining the shape of the international system in the
future.
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In support of his prediction, one might add that the international context of
ethno-nationalism today is qualitatively different from that of former periods
of nation formation. As already discussed in Part 1, today’s developed
system of nation-states now encompasses much of the world’s population.
The activities of nation-states both domestically and internationally are
mediated by expanding networks of interlocking IGOs, NGOs, and other
SNOs. These provide additional political arenas for nationalist movements to
acquire legitimation and political enfranchisement without necessarily having
to take on the burden of full-fledged statehood, which most of them would
have great difficulty to sustain.
Here one has to be careful about the use of the terms “statehood“ or
“nation-statehood.“ A state in the international system today, with a number
of exceptions, has its own armed forces, military-policy, foreign policy,
currency, etc. Yet, not all nationalist movements that want to become
independent states conceive of their statehood in these terms.  An example
is the movement for an independent Quebec. Creating its own armed forces
and having an independent security policy, two traditional attributes of
statehood, are not part of its program. For the Quebecois, independence is
something less than forming a 100% separate state and something
ambiguously more than achieving autonomous status.
2.5 Hroch’s historical analysis of self-determination
In his discussion of the origins of post-cold war movements for self-
determination, Miroslaw Hroch cautions against calling these movements
‘nationalist’ (Hroch, 1995, 65-66). His analysis is useful in distinguishing
historically different types of self-determination movements. He also
explains why such movements in the 19th century did not aim at
independent statehood, while so many ethno-nationalist movements today
pose statehood as their primary demand. He defines nationalism stricto
senso as “that state of mind which gives an absolute priority to the values of
one’s own nation over and above all other values and interest groups“ (ibid.,
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65). Hroch prefers to call movements for self-determination ‘national
movements’ and defines them as “organized efforts to achieve all the
attributes of a fully fledged nation“ (ibid., 66). Nationalism, as a state of
mind, was present in national movements, but was, according to Hroch,
only one of many forms of national and regional identities to emerge in
these movements. He discusses the particular characteristics of the
established nation-states of Europe whose development goes back to the
Middle Ages-England, France, Spain, Sweden, Denmark, Portugal, and the
Netherlands. They were ruled by homogenous elites and well-developed
social strata that included the aristocracy and the emerging industrial and
commercial bourgeoisie. They also had a highly developed national culture
and language. In contrast to these states, more than twenty non-dominant
ethnic groups were spread throughout the European continent in 1800,
including the relatively homogenous nation-states mentioned above. These
groups had ‘exogenous’ ruling classes and “occupied a compact territory
but lacked their ‘own’ (that is, belonging to their own ethnic group) ruling
class and continuous cultural tradition in their own literary language“ (ibid.,
66). At a certain point, some members of the ethnic group began to focus
on their own ethnicity and to conceive of their group as a potential nation.
They developed demands concerning the improvement of their national
culture, focusing on language, the creation of  a “complete social
structure,“ including their own educated elites, and the achievement of
equal civil rights and political self-determination (ibid.).
National movements in both Western and Eastern Europe developed,
according to Hroch, in three structural phases. In Phase A, activists
researched the linguistic, historical, and cultural attributes of their ethnic
group. In Phase B, a group of patriots emerged who win over members of
the ethnic group to the project of forming a nation.  In Phase C, the national
idea spreads, and a mass movement takes shape. An important difference
between Western and Eastern Europe lay in the fact that Western national
movements started their Phase B under conditions of a constitutional
regime. Phase B in Eastern movements, in contrast, unfolded within the late
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absolutist-feudal regimes,  the Hapsburg empire, the Ottoman empire,
Tsarist Russia, Prussia and Denmark.
In accounting for different types of national movements and whether or not
they eventually achieved  nation-statehood or merely one or another form of
autonomous status depends, for Hroch, on a number of factors. These
include the political system under which the national movement proceeded
during Phase B and Phase C and the social structure of the non-dominant
ethnic group. A third factor is the group’s historical development.
Hroch distinguishes three levels or stages of national political programs that
describe different types of demands for self-determination. The first is
substitution, an elementary level of political programs, in which only “partial
elements of politics entered into the national programme“ (ibid., 70).
Included here are attempts to keep the unity of the ethnic territory and thus
to cultivate the image of ‘the fatherland.’ Hroch’s point here is that
linguistic and cultural demands sometimes temporarily substituted for some
functions of explicit political aims. The second level consists in demands
for participation, for example, in local (municipal) administration, in elected
bodies at different levels of government (for example, the Reichstag and
Landtag in Austria after the introduction of a constitutional regime in 1860).
The struggle for participation posed four groups of demands that
encompassed campaigns for municipal self-government; entry into all levels
of state and regional administration; participation in legislative power,
including courts of justice; and participation in executive power.
The third level or type of self-determination movement was secession based
on the aim of the leaders of the national movement to achieve greater
autonomy within what they considered ‘their’ territory. Hroch convincingly
argues that until World War II in Austro-Hungary and in Russia, the
demand for autonomy (not independent statehood) remained “the central
point of the secessionist component in the programme of national
movements“ (ibid., 73). With the exception of the Magyars in Hungary,
37
whose national movement successfully ended in independence, “no relevant
group demanded full independence“ (ibid.). With this historical evidence,
Hroch argues that the theories of nationalism that define national goals
solely as the struggle for independence are not empirically correct. The
majority of national movements in Central and Eastern Europe achieved
independent statehood, but this goal was not in their national programs,
which were based on less ambitious goals. External factors, namely, World
War I and the Russian Revolution in 1917, were responsible for the shift of
direction and later goals of these movements. Once independence was
achieved, it only then became the political bottom line for these new
independent states. After independence was lost under fascism and later
(for Central and Eastern European states) under Soviet rule,
38
national independence remained the core demand that would re-emerge with
the end of the Cold War.
Hroch also points out that some movements did not achieve full independ-
ence in the inter-war period. Examples are the Slovenes, Slovaks, Croatians,
Ukrainians, Macedonians and Belorussians. They became independent with
the end of Soviet communism.
Hroch’s analysis thus helps to illuminate how World War I and the October
Revolution transformed the nature and the demands of self-determination
movements.  His analysis is suggestive in a number of ways concerning the
relationship between national movements and supranational organization.
World War I marked a turning point. It was a “total war“ (Hawdon, 1996,
60) that required the states involved to strengthen their control over a
substantial amount of the functioning of their national economies. The war
fundamentally changed the supranational setting of self-determination and
nationalist movements by ushering in, in the words of Hawdon, “a new
level of functionalized rule“ of the state. Because of the demands of total
war in terms of organizing resources and mobilizing the population against a
new array of weapons capable of unprecedented lethality, the state required
a much higher magnitude of power. This expansion of centralized state
power was reflected in the rise of fascism, socialism, and communism and
the type of mass mobilization and intensified nationalism expressed by
national populations that fervently supported their governments and their
respective war aims. The war paved the way for the permanent installation
of the “mixed economy.“ The state would henceforth play a much larger
role in the economy. The international system also became more integrated.
IGOs, NGOs, and other SNOs would play a larger role but yet could not
reverse the trend of expanding inter-state nationalism, including the
isolationism of the United States that helped pave the way to World War II.
In the new international setting, in which the traditional multinational, multi-
ethnic empires disappeared and the nation-state was the primary and most
powerful actor in the international system, the demand for statehood by
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self-determination movements became much more widespread. The League
of Nation became their most important champion.
Following World War II, states ascended new heights of power commen-
surate with the scale of the conflict. The term “super-power“ was coined to
express the new military and political position of the United States and the
SU. The greater  power  of  the  nation-state  and its reinforcement in the
bloc system of the East-West conflict called forth a corresponding new
wave of IGOs, NGOs, and other SNOs.
2.6 The state-centered approach
John Breuilly links nationalism to the emergence of the modern state and its
interaction with the international system of states. In differentiating his
theoretical concerns from other theories of nationalism, his patience is short
with approaches that favor cultural explanations and disregard the quest for
state power by nationalist movements. "Other writers,“ he tells us, “have
related nationalism to particular class interests or to the pursuit of large-
scale social and economic change. Although particular nationalist
movements can be illuminated by reference to the role of this or that class,
or to the attempt to create a modern economy, I do not think that these
matters should be made central to an understanding of nationalism
generally. To focus upon culture, ideology, class or modernisation is to
neglect the fundamental point that nationalism is, above and beyond all else,
about politics and politics is about power. Power, in the modern world, is
primarily about control of the state. The central question, therefore, should
be to relate nationalism to the objective of obtaining and using state power“
(Breuilly, 1982, 1-2). Nationalism is thus a form of politics and generated
by activities of the state.
Breuilly criticizes class-focused theories of the state by arguing that
nationalism has no particular class character. He points out that classes are
often divided on national issues and that diverse class fractions unite to
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form national constituencies. Nationalist movements that aim at either
reforming the state, separating from it, or assimilating into it are determined
by the existing state apparatus and the “system of competing territorial
states“ (Breuilly, 1982b, 365, as cited in Goodman, 1996, 21). But Breuilly
also argues that this type of nationalism is an anachronism of the 19th
century. In today’s inter-connected world, the state is not as independent in
its activities and policymaking from other forces and actors in the
international system as it was formerly. Here Breuilly implicitly broaches the
question of the relationship of states to supranational organizations without
taking it up. His analysis begs the question of the functions, achievements
and deficits of IGOs in dealing with nationalism.
Breuilly links the erosion of traditional state sovereignty to what he views as
the wider and dangerous dissemination of national rhetoric into avenues and
niches of social political life where it does not belong. This spread of
nationalist ideology can perhaps be interpreted as a symptom of the political
vacuum left by the decline of national state sovereignty and the failure in
IGOs to take up the slack in supranational governance. In studying the
question of the decline of the nation-state and state sovereignty in this light,
the student of nationalism and SNOs must also consider the counter-
tendency, namely, the extent to which IGOs strengthen state sovereignty
and state nationalism. Supranational organization provides traditional and
new kinds of international legitimacy and power to nation-states, to both
hegemonial and other major powers. It also provides smaller states with a
formally equal voice in IGOs.11
2.7 Modernization theories of nationalism
Karl Deutsch explains the development of nationalism by focusing on the
                                                
11 Small states often play an important role in breaking deadlocks in IGOs, when large
powers cannot agree. During the Cold War, the coalition of Neutral and Non-Aligned
States in the former CSCE repeatedly played a major role in working out successful
compromise positions between East and West.
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socio-economic requirements of modern industrial society. For Deutsch,
nationalism is a distinctly modern phenomenon that is derived from the
“mass mobilization of precommercial, predindustrial peasant peoples“ and
their transition to industrial economies (Deutsch, 1966, 190). In examining
the deficiencies and confusion in traditional explanations of nationalism,
Deutsch argues that the problem lies in placing the study of nationalism on a
more scientific basis. His approach stems from the tradition of Enlighten-
ment rationalism, specifically its scientific materialism and empiricism. He
links nationalism with the historical, economic and political progress made
possible by science and its application to politics and social life in general.
Social communication lies at the core of Deutsch’s theory of sovereignty,
power, community and the nation. The nature of political power is
dependent on the highly uneven distribution of “social communication
facilities“ and of economic and cultural interdependence (Deutsch, 1966,
75; Snyder, 1976, 6). Under “communication facilities“ Deutsch includes a
socially standardized system of symbols, including language and other
codes, such as alphabets, systems of writing, calculating, in short, all
channels and also infrastructures for storing, recalling, and recombining
information. He defines a people in terms of communication, as a group of
persons linked by specific “complementary habits and facilities of
communication“ (Deutsch, 1966, 96). The development of the national
culture of nation-states is a function of the quantitative increase in
communication (for example, through transport, radio, and telecommunic a-
tions). The resulting growth of functional interdependence shapes
subjective, affective communication between individuals and modifies
channels of culture and values (Deutsch 1966, 38; cited in Goodman, 1996,
16-17). In this way, the rise of industrialism and the modern market
economy “offer[s] economic and psychological rewards to tense and
insecure individuals - to men and women uprooted by social and
technological change, exposed to the risks of economic competition, and
taught to hunger for success“ (Deutsch, 1966, cited in Smith, 1983, 96).
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Deutsch views nationalism through the prism of modernization, its effects
on traditional social ties, and the sense of security and belonging destroyed
by industrialism and the progress of market relations. The nation-state has
the role of helping to create a new community and culture to replace what
industrialism destroys. Nationality is achieved through advancing means of
communication, that is, by creating “a community of complementary habits
and facilities of communciation.“ (Deutsch, 1966, 96).
The nation-state, nationality, the increasing efficiency and functionality of
infrastructures of communication in the broadest sense are for Deutsch
motors of modernization and progress that are scientifically measurable and
will eventually eliminate the unevenness of development among the world’s
peoples. Deutsch was so optimistic about nationalism as a force of
modernization that he maintained in the mid-1960s that the “mobilization [of
precommercial, preindustrial peasant peoples] and their transition to an
industrial economy should be substantially completed within the next two
generations“ (ibid., 190).  While nationalism “ has grouped people apart
from each other, and may for a time continue to do so, it is preparing them,
and perhaps has already prepared them, for a more thoroughgoing world-
wide unity than has ever been seen in human history“ (ibid., 191).
History has not born out Deutsch’s bold prediction concerning the
integration of precommercial, preindustrial peasant peoples, who still
abound in abject poverty throughout the less developed regions of the
world. Neither the pace of industrialization nor its impact has brought about
“world-wide unity“ of peoples. Nor has it created a more balanced
distribution of wealth, income, or access to the instruments creating wealth
or for that matter to the resources of communication.
Deutsch’s predictions were clearly overly optimistic and in the tradition of
the Enlightenment’s oversimplified view of human history and the role of
reason. His naïve modernism and optimism infused his teleological sense of
infinite progress through science and a vision of the progressive elimination
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barriers between nation-states through advancing infrastructures,
technologies, and increasingly complex cultures of communication.
Despite its oversimplifications, Deutsch’s ambitious project to theorize
modernization as a finite and measurable set of progressively developing
modes of communication within and between nation-states takes on a new
relevance in our post-modern, rapidly self-digitizing epoch. His theory
views the world and everything in it, including nation-states, and by
implication supranational organizations, through the prism of measurable
data and communication (or in his terms, cybernetic) logic. He would have
viewed the end of the Cold War and the contemporary revolution in
computer, communication and other technologies, and their application at
the state level and supranationally, as a confirmation of his approach and
general conclusions.
Deutsch’s reductionism certainly has its limits, which we will take up
below. Yet, his work remains an ambitious and brilliant attempt to situate
nationalism in the historical development of social communication. He
analyzes the impact of communication technologies on the uneven
development of nation-states and their integration as global communication
networks. Deutsch’s work is likely to be an important source of ideas and
inspiration for the student of nationalism studying the current and future
problems of the inter-relationship between supranational organizations and
nation-states.
In order to illustrate this without going into detail, let us take the example of
the relations among IGOs today. Part 1 of this essay briefly discussed the
problems of coordination and collaboration between IGOs among
themselves and with other actors on the stage of supranational politics. I
discussed the need for reform, including technical and functional
improvements, especially given the new challenges in the post-cold-war
environment. Inter-organizational information flows and consultation among
IGOs and relations between IGOs and NGOs have not caught up either
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with current political needs or with technological advances, especially in
dealing with crises, conflicts, and global problems. The activities of IGOs
should be broadened, while bureaucratic redundancy with its attendant
costs reduced. Using new technologies more systematically to advance the
political activity and administration of IGOs, which are already years if not
decades behind global corporations in integrating new technological
advances into their operations, would be a positive advance. Such
application of high technology in supranational politics is likely to become
more urgent. For this purpose, both practical and theoretical work are
necessary.
Certainly, the inter-organizational deficiencies of IGOs cannot be reduced to
mere functional and technical problems. Functional changes in supranational
organizations are complexly linked to power relationships. Political initiatives
are necessary to improve inter-organizational communication and
information flows through the application of new technologies. Internet-
related technologies and applications (email, web sites, web commerce,
web newscasting, etc.) are likely to have, as Deutsch’s theory foreshad-
owed, a profound cultural-political impact on communication across
national borders. The further development of new technologies is also likely
to significantly affect the operations and effectiveness of IGOs functionally
and politically, assuming the political will to support and not block such
change more clearly emerges.  It is already clear that the internet is having a
profound effect on the interaction of societies throughout the world by
eliminating many of the barriers to communication that have served as an
enabling condition for the formation of nations and nationalism.
2.8 The critique of modernization theories
Modernization theories of nationalism and the nation-state, including
Deutsch’s work, have fueled a number of highly controversial debates
among theorists of nationalism. Anthony Smith has criticized the following
three assumptions of the modernization theories of nationalism based on
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communication theory:
“1 The process of ‘modernisation’, once set in motion, follows an inevitable
progression with its own momentum, despite minor variations
2 This progression is basically modelled on the pattern of Western evolution
[of nationalism and the nation-state]
3 The key to the ‘modernisation’ process is the growth of mobile
personalities possessing the capacity to transmit information in a meaningful
manner between individuals and groups; and this creates national cultures
and communities“ (Smith, 1983, 96).
    
Smith elaborates his critique by arguing that the dyadic conception of
‘modernization’ and nationalism, which is Western in origin, is both
ethnocentric and “crudely determinist“ (ibid.). It conceives of ‘modernity’
as an ‘end-state’ and “as an exclusive system of interdependent parts
opposed to another homologous system called ‘tradition’; the assumptions,
practices, institutions, roles and values of these total orders are diametrically
opposite and separate“ (ibid.).
Smith’s own theory of nationalism assumes and convincingly demonstrates
much greater continuity between modernity and pre-modern past. For
Smith, the crucial defect of ‘communications’ theory is its lack of historical
specificity, its omission of the “particular context of beliefs and interpreta-
tions“ within which information media operate (ibid., 101).
In his critique of ‘modernist’ theorists of nationalism, Smith concedes “that
there have been important breaks in historical development and that one of
them can be located in early modern Europe with the advent of the
‘rational’ state capitalism and industrialism“ (Smith, 1988). While it has its
uses in historical explanation, he cautions that “this particular myth“ should
not deflect our attention from the role of cultural and historical communities
and identities in pre-modern periods.
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Smith thus does not deny the importance of certain basic types of
nationalism that result from the process of modernization in Deutsch’s
sense of industrialization and the corresponding development of  social
communication. But he repeatedly warns that too much emphasis on
nationalism’s modernizing potential and association with modernity
“overlooks the importance of its ethnic roots in the past“ (Smith, 1983, ix).
 He also notes different types of statements about nationalism and calls for
greater clarity and differentiation. For example, the historical assertion that
nationalism as an ideological movement first emerged in the late eighteen
century Europe and is considered a specifically ‘modern’ phenomenon
should be distinguished from the sociological claim that nationalism is itself
a modernizing force that can be explained by anterior forces of moderniza-
tion (ibid., x). The student of nationalism should not, according to Smith,
neglect modernizing forces, such as capitalism, urbanization, bureaucra-
tism, and science, but should also take into account ethnicity and the ethnic
revival that began in the 1970s. Writing in the early 1980s, he called for a
shift in nationalism research away from ‘modernization’ in the direction of
ethnic studies. He argued such a focus was also necessary to move beyond
the Eurocentrism prevalent in both historical and sociological approaches to
nationalism.12
Although Smith is identified with an approach to nationalism that links it to
its ethnic origins, he has tried to combine pre-modern and modern elements
in his definition of the nation. He posits his definition as a critique of the
Western modernist conceptions of the nation. This “civic conception treats
nations as units of population which inhabit a demarcated territory, possess
a common economy with mobility in a single territory-wide occupational
and production system, common laws with identical legal rights and duties
                                                
12 It should be noted that Hans Kohn writing in the 1940s developed a theory and
typology of nationalism that focused on the differences between Western and non-
Western types of nationalism. Kohn contrasts the respective social-political and
economic conditions of their respective development (Kohn, 1944; Kohn, 1949).  For
a concise overview of Kohn’s work in this area, see Snyder, 1976, 29-32.
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for everyone, and a public, mass education system“ (Smith, 1988). In
Smith’s ethnic-based view, nations are “named human populations claiming
a common ancestry, a demotic solidarity, common customs and
vernaculars, and a common native history“ (ibid.). These are ethnic
categories that infuse nationalism and explain its premodern ethnic core. An
ethnic community, or ethnie, is defined by Smith as “a named human
population possessing a myth of common descent, common historical
memories, elements of shared culture, an association with a particular
territory, and a sense of solidarity“ (ibid.).
Combining both the above pre-modern and modern characteristics, Smith
defines the nation as “a named human population sharing a myth of
common descent, historical memories and a mass culture, and possessing a
demarcated territory, common economy and common legal rights and
duties“ (ibid.). He recommends this definition because it allows for either a
pre-modern or modernizing emphasis without falling into the common
practice of irreconcilably opposing them.
Smith’s emphasis on the ethnic and ethnic-ideological components of
nationalism helps to illuminate the historical background and pre-modern
elements in extreme forms of ethnic nationalist mobilization that have re-
emerged in recent years. Following the end of the Cold War, ex-communist
societies that have not undergone the traditional Western process of
“modernization“ have been particularly prone to extreme forms of ethnic
mobilization.  These have included ethno-nationalist war and inter-ethnic
genocides, as have occurred, in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in other parts of
the former Yugoslavia since the early 1990s. Smith’s analysis is also useful
in studying non-European nationalism and the effects of colonialism on
ethnic and nationalist development in Africa, Asia, and Central and South
America. His systematic studies of the theories of nationalism (1983) and
the ethnic origins of nationalism (1986) provides a wealth of material on
pre-modern forms and precursors of modern nationalism from different
regions of the world and different epochs.
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Since the Enlightenment, ethnic mobilization, according to Smith, derives
from the opposition of a disaffected intelligentsia opposing inefficient and
corrupt state structures that are not congruent with ‘the ethno-nation.’ This
non-congruence generates disloyalty and disaffection that, if not remedied,
will condemn the state to instability and possibly fragmentation. Smith
distinguishes three great waves of nationalist mobilization. The first was the
nineteenth century revolt against the imperial, autocratic state in the name of
national popular sovereignty and national cultural self-determination. The
second wave erupted with anti-colonial nationalism. The third wave of
nationalist mobilization was the eruption of ethno-nationalism in western
liberal democracies.
The major powers underestimated ethnic factors in the Balkans and
elsewhere and the extent to which extreme nationalist leaders could mobilize
popular fears linked to pre-modern ethnic myths of community and identity
and past inter-ethnic conflict and war. The majority of the nationalist
movements in the Balkans, the ex-Soviet republics, and the Russian
Federation (including the anti-Russian war for independence in Chechnya)
have long histories that pre-date their resurgence in late 1980s and 1990s.
Some of these movements can be traced back to the 19th century and in a
few cases much earlier (Minaham, 1996).
Smith’s analysis begs a number of questions concerning the political
interaction of IGOs and ethnic-nationalist mobilization. Ethnic nationalist
movements today, particularly in areas that have received the most attention
in the West, such as the former Yugoslavia, may be partially explainable by
the pre-modern dynamics and legacies that Smith elaborates.  Yet he fails to
sufficiently note that the ethnic wars in the Balkans have not unfolded in a
supranational vacuum devoid of IGOs, NGOs and other SNOs. The
competition and cooperation of major powers acting sometimes in tandem
with and sometimes in conflict with particular IGOs is also at play. The
presence of these “larger-than-the-nation“ political actors transformed the
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Balkan ethnic-conflict arena into ‘glocalized’ phenomena: the action and
non-action of major powers (in the Contact Group, for example) and of
IGOs co-
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determined the pre-conflict, conflict, and post-conflict stages of these
ethno-national struggles.13
The global context of many ethno-nationalist conflicts and movements
today poses largely still unanswered questions concerning how IGOs and
other SNOs impact on the pre-natal aspirations, formation, and development
of state-fragmenting, irredentist, separatist, and other forms of ethno-
nationalism. Neither the modernist school of nationalism nor its critics,
including Smith, have explicitly approached this issue.14 Has the prolifera-
tion of IGOs and SNOs weakened or changed the nature of the nation-state
during the Cold War era in a way that prepared the way for the eruption of
ethno-nationalism in the aftermath of the East-West conflict? Are perhaps
modernist biases or ‘myths,’ as Smith characterizes them (1988), getting in
the way of how IGOs and the international community in general try to deal
with ethno-nationalism? Can a new theoretical synthesis be developed that
could take in the pre-modern, modernist, and what I have called in Part 1 of
this essay the ‘post-modernist’ dimension of nationalism? Such a synthesis
should be able to shed a more precise light on the relationship and inter-
penetration of the pre-modernist and modernist dimensions of nationalism.
A synthesis of this kind has become one
                                                
13 Smith does argue, however, that globalization triggers ethno-national reaction because
it is viewed by ethno-national communities as threatening to their identity (Smith,
1990, as cited by Goodman, 1996, 14).
14 The class-centered approaches to nationalism are better at capturing some of central
supranational political dynamics that affect nationalist movements. Samir Amin, for
example, explores the relationship between the dynamics of capitalism and the
development of nationalist movements through the interaction of centers of capitalist
accumulation in core national states and subordinate societies in the periphery.
National class alliances are shaped by this process, which also determines national
interests that are challenged, transformed and re-formed over time. Amin elaborates
on how national class alliances play a central role not only in the core nation-states
but also in the periphery. Subordinate societies in which local comprador elites ally
with capital generate dependent forms of capitalist production in these peripheral
countries (Amin, 1980; Goodman, 1996, 24-25). Amin’s approach, like that of other
‘class-centered’ theorists of nationalism (Hobsbawm and Blaut [1987]) fail to take up
the specific role of IGOs and other SNOs and how they impact on nationalist
movements and nation-states. 
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of the major challenges of states, IGOs, and other SNOs that have to deal
with complex ethno-nationalist movements as part of their daily work.
2.9 Individualistic versus collectivistic nationalism
Liah Greenfeld differentiates between types of nationalism according to
interpretations of the principles of popular sovereignty and equality.15 She
shows how these function in the definition of the “nation“ adopted by
particular groups. The nation can either be defined as a composite entity, an
association of free and equal individuals, or in unitary terms, as a collective
individual. The former definition gives rise to “individualistic nationalisms“
and favors the development of liberal political arrangements:
"The interests of the nation, as well as its sovereignty or will, in this case,
are but reflections of the interest of the majority of its members and their
wills. The rights of individuals - human rights - are supreme among the
nation’s values. The definition of the nation as a collective individual, by
contrast, results in collectivistic nationalisms which tend to spawn
authoritarian political arrangements. In this case, the nation is believed to
possess a will and interests of its own, to which the wills and interests of
its individual members are subservient and may at any moment be
sacrificed“ (Greenfeld, 1997).
Greenfeld derives from her distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism
three types of nationalism: “individualistic and civic,“ “collectivistic and
civic,“ and “collectivistic and ethnic.“ Her differentiations are useful in
examining contemporary nationalist movements and the problems faced by
states and IGOs in resolving ethno-nationalist conflicts. In placing human
rights at the center of her conceptualization, she incorporates into her
approach a basic aim and “methodology“ of IGOs involved in preventing
and resolving ethno-nationalist conflicts and nurturing new independent
                                                
15 See in this context Greenfeld’s major historical work (Greenfeld, 1992).
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states. To become a member of major IGOs, a nation-state must adopt a
number of universally recognized human-rights commitments.  Similarly,
their implementation by states and or by conflicting parties in pre-conflict or
post-conflict situations is an essential indicator to IGOs, NGOs, and other
SNOs of progress or regression.
Greenfeld’s implicit “human-rights perspective“ on nationalism provides a
useful bridge between the intellectual domain of theories of nationalism and
practical world of supranational politics that must grapple with different
types of nationalist struggles throughout the world. The enormous
expansion of the human-rights codexes of IGOs and other SNOs since the
1980s has given greater recognition and political-legal legitimation to a much
wider array of political, religious, gender-, sex- and ethnic-based individual
rights and -- to a lesser extent -- group rights. The OSCE, COE, and the
UN have been at the forefront of this activity (Lucas, 1992, 1993 and
1995c). The human rights revolution has further legitimized an expanded
ethnic, and cultural pluralism in supranational politics, diplomacy and grass-
roots activism. Many previously neglected or suppressed claims of
traditional groups and movements have woven themselves into the cultural-
political fabric of national and international relations. Among them are
communities that define themselves mainly in terms of their pre-modern
traditions and their rights to live as individuals and communities according
to their respective religious, cultural and societal traditions. Human-rights
instruments have provided a means of “recombining“ and mutually adjusting
the pre-modern and the modern. The expansion of human rights codexes
have helped nation-states to construct and legitimize a larger plurality of
ethnic, cultural, and national groups within their national polities. Such an
expansion has become politically and economically necessary today.
2.10 The search for a broader synthesis
Theoretically fleshing out a “post-modernist“ approach to nationalism would
necessarily have to integrate both the ethno-nationalist approach reflected in
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authors, such as Anthony Smith, and representatives of the modernist
school. Ernest Gellner, a leading exponent of the modernist approach, is
often targeted by critics of the modernization school. His work provides,
however, a number of potential building blocks for a post-modernist
synthesis. In what follows, I will attempt to briefly discuss Gellner in this
light.
2.11 From a modernist to post-modernist perspective
Gellner builds his theory of nationalism on the shoulders of Karl Deutsch’s
approach. Gellner focuses on the dynamic economic, social, and cultural
elements of industrial modernization. These include the notion of a profound
historical-cultural divide between agrarian and industrial society. 
In feudal and agrarian societies, the given social structure predetermined the
individual’s social identity, social position, and life path (Gellner, 1997, 20).
Individual existence was fixed and static. In industrial society, in contrast,
with its need for an educated work force and labor mobility, citizens
assume different roles in their lifetime. The individual must adjust to the
condition of being “substitutable“ within the workforce. Change is a
constant condition of social life and work, made possible by a common,
shared “high culture.“ In this environment, culture and nationalism become
more important for the individual’s identity, for his or her identification with
the “imagined community“ of the nation, and for the reproduction of a
socially coherent, industrially functioning society. The state with its control
over education and other infrastructures tries to create a nationally
homogenized culture able to assimilate different cultures and groups, reduce
social tensions between rulers and ruled, and integrate nationalist and other
oppositions. The state compensates for the depersonalizing forces of
modernization by re-socializing the individual in its national culture.
Industrial society produces what Gellner calls “modular man,“ individuals
who are no longer bound to ritual, blood relations, mirco-communities, but
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share a common culture which is also co-extensive with the nation and
society (Gellner, 1996, 97-108). Culture is also the medium of transmission
through which the individual learns to wear and identify with the different
roles and identities he or she will assume in life.  Where blood relations,
ritual and agrarian micro-communities are static, tradition-bound, and rigid,
the cultural ether which the modern citizen breathes makes him or her
responsive, dynamic and flexible. “Modular man is capable of combining
into effective association and institutions, without these being total, many-
stranded, underwritten by ritual. He can combine into specific-purpose, ad
hoc, limited association“ (ibid., 100). Unlike his peasant predecessor of the
pre-modern era, modular man can perform highly diverse tasks because of
the shared, common language of industrial culture. He is individualistic and
egalitarian and forms the backbone of what Gellner calls “Civil Society“
(ibid.). Because of modular man, the society with an industrial structure is
also flexible, cohesive, and a machine of progress.
Gellner analyzes the interplay of affective and effective forms of
communication and their relationship to nationalism. To the extent that
social assimilation achieved through effective, functional communication is
deficient, affective, cultural differences are heightened. These generate
social differences and fragment the state-centered national community into
oppositional nationalisms. The society tries to provide a structure to
assimilate different groups and oppositional nationalist currents. To the
extent that this does not succeed, the personal and cultural aspects of
identity become more necessary and pronounced. The state compensates
for the depersonalizing forces of modernization by re-socializing the
individual into the “imagined community“ of its national culture.
2.11.1 Weaknesses of Gellner’s theory
Like other theorists of nationalism, Gellner does not deal with IGOs or other
SNOs, although his basic theses on modernization is suggestive concerning
the impact of supranational organization on nationalism and the nation-state.
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Just as the individual was socially, psychologically and culturally recast in
the transition from agrarian to modern society, so too were states forced to
develop a common “syntax and semantics“ to relate to each other in their
interaction. We call this particular “high culture“ that is shared by states
international diplomacy and international relations. Without it, neither
modernization nor the types of nationalism it has generated, as theorized by
Gellner, would exist. The larger context of supranationalism impacts on the
objects of Gellner’s inquiry, including the ‘modern’ individual, identity and
culture, identification of the individual with the nation-state, and how
nationalism is felt and expressed by the individual.
Once supranationalism is brought into the discussion as a necessary (and
missing) variable in Gellner’s theory, his notions of “modernity“ and
“nationalism“ reveal their deficiencies as theoretical descriptions of the
contemporary world. His notion of “nationalism“ oversimplifies moderniza-
tion as a process of transformation because he reduces and constrains it
within the nation-state, which is insufficient because it is clearly co-
determined by its supranational environment. This short-coming in Gellner’s
work leads to a number of contradictions in his notion of “modular man.“
The citizen-individual that Gellner portrays is flexible, open to change, and
highly responsive to his/her multi-leveled environment. Given these
characteristics, the modern nation-state with its penchant for a relatively
uniform national culture and its nationalist prejudices is too narrow as an
explanatory and “residential“ framework for this very cosmopolitan being.
Gellner’s failure to situate his “modular man“ in the larger world beyond the
national confines of the “modern state“ makes his national state into a
theoretical procrustean bed. This is true not only in a cultural-geographical
sense but also historically and trans-temporally. If “modular man“ were
situated in the larger supranational world, it would also be easier to
reconcile this creature’s “modernity“ with the “pre-modern“ cultures and
ways of life that Gellner and other modernist theorists simplistically banish
from their theoretical constructs.
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2.11.2 “Modular man“ and multiculturalism
Gellner’s concept of “modularity“ could in many ways fit the multinational-
ist world of the kind that has become increasingly evident today as a result
of globalization and supranationalization. The flexibility and adaptability of
Gellner’s modular individual, and his/her ability to absorb new skills and
cultural traits implicitly supercedes the limits of a highly cohesive and
uniform political culture Gellner associates with the nation-state. 
Similarly, Gellner’s notion of the nation-state appears somewhat anachro-
nistic in today’s world in which the nation-state is being challenged by
multiculturalization, multinationalism and supranationalization, as discussed
throughout this essay.  As a result of these processes, the uniformity of
national culture and the “imagined community“ of the nation-state is
undergoing erosion and transformation. These changes are perhaps most
protrusively and provocatively visible in multinational corporations,
“glocalized“ markets, global media, advertising imagery, and corporate
culture.  They are also visible in youth culture and in the role of IGOs,
NGOs, and other SNOs in their struggle to manage supranational problems
that have penetrated the anachronistic insularities and inner cellular organs
of the “modern“ nation-state.
In short, Gellner’s “modular man“ should not be taken simply for a
nationist, self-evidently ready to die for his nation-state, which is one of
standard touchstones of genuine nationalism. “Modular man“ is more
complex, not only in terms of his gender (he is also a “she“), but also more
of a supranationalist in his/her Dasein and thinking about the world, work,
personal identity, culture and nationalism.
In defense of modernization theorists, Gellner’s modernizing state or "Civil
Society“ is equipped to adapt to the multicultural diversity that is evident
today.  This state is thus able to integrate the separate cultures and ethnic
groups that have emerged or re-emerged to challenge the nation-state’s
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anachronistically narrow political sovereignty and cultural hegemony.
Today’s post-modern, post-industrial, multicultural societies and enclaves
are characterized by a qualitatively greater degree of cultural, ethnic, and
life-style diversity than was accepted or possible only several decades ago.
The “culture wars“ that have accompanied the emergence of social
movements since the 1960s reflect this diversity and an emergent “post-
modernist pluralism.“
A weakness of the modernization theories of nationalism is thus their failure
to anticipate the extent to which post-modernizing trends have put into
question the national-cultural cohesion and political-cultural coherence of
the modern nation-state. Ethnic and minority movements often try to
reconstruct their respective culture, ethnic roots, and elements of their
forebears’ customs and life-styles. Modernization and the culturally
homogenizing nationalism of the modern nation-state tried to subordinate
such movements and groups within a single, narrowly defined national
heritage. The modern nation-state has discriminated against such cultures
and minorities that became subordinate and largely hidden from sight, often
culturally exiled to the bottom of the proverbial “melting pot.“ In many
cases, these movements, ethnies, minorities, (and former majorities),
including indigenous peoples, were simply suppressed, often with violence
in the name of national unity, national culture, and national security. Black,
indigenous peoples, and Hispanics in the United States and Canada,
aborigines in Australia, the pre-colonial black nations in Southern Africa,
Hungarians in Rumania, are examples.
Gellner insufficiently focuses on the historical exclusion of groups from
citizenship and the nation-building project of modernization and the type of
nationalism and nation-state political culture linked to it. Exclusion and often
persecution of minority groups was often inflicted because of race, religion
or ethnic identification (Zollberg 1983, 24).16 This weakness conjures up
                                                
16 These were the victims of the modernization project of reconfiguring of geographical-
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again Smith’s general criticism of modernization theorists that they are
insensitive to the pre-modern, ethnic origins of nationalism. For the same
reason, Gellner’s framework cannot adequately account for the re-
emergence of pre-modern factors in industrial and post-industrial society
and, more importantly how these “recombine“ with the cultural traits of
modernization.
The post-modern, multicultural and multinational trends of today are most
pronounced in advanced liberal, constitutional democracies and civil
societies in North America and Europe, but they are also evident as an
unevenly evolving trend throughout the world. The advance of global
multiculturalism has developed on the foundations of modernizing
nationalism, the model of mass society it has bred, and the free-speech and
human-rights culture of the constitutional liberal state.17 A major thrust of
post-modern movements has also been the deconstruction of “moderniza-
tion“ ideologies and their too narrowly unifying cultural nationalism.
In the domestic-global cultural environment of the late 20th century, the
appeal of quasi-monocultural national narratives imposed by established
elites has become less gripping, legitimate, or politically unifying and self-
sustaining. Such dominant national narratives have given way to a
                                                                                                                                                
political space into nation-states and creating homogeneous national cultures. In the
latter half of the 15th century when Spain emphasized religious unity as a central
foundation for the constitution of itself as a modern state, Jews and Moslems were
among the excluded and the nation-state’s first refugees. The expelled Jews made up
roughly two percent of the Spain’s total population, or between 120,000 and 150,000
persons (Zollberg, 1983, 32). Spain is an example of how modernizing nationalism
entailed a process of minority expulsion that was woven into the founding fabric of the
European nation-state. Besides the Jews and Moslems, there were also the Protestants
of the Low Countries and the Puritans and Quakers in England. There were also the
French Huguenots and the more contemporary cases of stateless groups resulting from
the dissolution of colonial empires in Africa and Asia and their reconfiguration as
nation-states (ibid.,24).
17 Curiously, many of the staunchest defenders of post-modernism have tended not to
notice these links and misunderstand them in their criticism and even rejection of
liberalism and pluralism.
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multicultural, more eclectic, nationalist ethos that has legitimized the
deconstructionist critique of the modernizing state while taking advantage of
its liberal, democratic, equalitarian ethos. It is natural that IGOs and other
SNOs have generally been very supportive of these trends, in part because
they contribute to greater inter-state mutual understanding, cross-cultural
exchange, and cooperation. IGOs have thus helped nation-states adapt their
practice of sovereignty to multiculturalization and to new formal and
informal norms, including human-rights standards. Many of these
standards, considered virtually unthinkable two decades ago, have become
widely recognized, although not adequately implemented or enforced.
In sum, Gellner provides a number of important theoretical building blocks
for a post-modernist theory of the nation-state and supranationalism. A
“post-modern synthesis“ would have to incorporate pre-modern traditions
and show how these interpenetrate with traditions of modernity. It would
recognize that the “glocalized“ setting in which ethnies and cultures exist
today have significantly modified them. This new environment consists of a
highly diverse plurality of cultures, characterized by a high degree of
interaction and “recombination“ in novel forms. Nationalisms are being
further constructed and deconstructed at different interaction levels of
social and political groups and inter-personal relations. The process as a
whole is being impacted by and feeding back into culture industries, local,
national and supranational politics, and nationalist movements.
The emerging post-modern plurality of cultures and communities is in a
very early stage of development. Yet it is already developed enough to
suggest that modernism and pre-modernism are in fact the two sides of the
temporal and territorial “multiculturalization“ of the nation-state conceptual-
ized in a preliminary way in Part 1.
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Conclusion
In the foregoing analysis I have tried to show that nation-states, although
bound by traditional constraints and prejudices of national sovereignty,
operate today in an increasingly globalized, supranational environment. The
discrepancies between the political and legal premises of national
sovereignty and the demands of supranational realities have produced a
multiplicity of economic, political-cultural and international-legal policy
deficits. Their symptoms and results include the failure of the international
community to act in a timely way to prevent the succession of wars in the
former Yugoslavia, the genocide in Rwanda, the conflict in Chechnya and,
more generally, the upsurge in ethno-nationalist conflict since the end of the
Cold War.
The end of the East-West conflict ushered in a new era of global economic
and social openness and volatile waves of uneven, constructive and
disintegrative transformation. The technological revolution continues to
accelerate this process of change at the local, national, and global level at a
speed that is significantly outpacing the adjustment of national and
supranational political institutions. This gap has made it imperative that
nation-states develop new strategies for achieving greater cooperation
among international actors and new forms of supranational regulation and
global governance functions.
The nation-state has remained the central actor in the international political
system, although the state’s prerogatives of national sovereignty are
diminishing by being increasingly mediated and reshaped by IGOs and other
SNOs. Given its position as a guarantor of democratic legitimacy based on
popular sovereignty, the nation-state will and must remain an indispensable
agent of promoting and institutionalizing new forms of supranational global
governance. The latter are perceived by nation-states as both advantageous
and threatening. The successful democratic nation-states of the world tend
to have  the  greatest  interest in propagating democratic principles, human
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rights,
judicial institutions, geo-political openness and cooperation on level of
supranational politics.
Nation-states are also under pressure of civil-societal forces operating both
domestically and internationally to advance the forces of supranationalism.
Nevertheless, states are reluctant to take needed, more far-reaching
measures to reform their own nationally oriented domestic institutions and
policymaking infrastructures out of fear of abdicating their sovereignty and
potentially losing political power in the real-political pecking order of states.
Nation-states must develop in a more concerted manner multinational
domestic and foreign policies in line with the de facto multinationalization of
the nation-state, as discussed throughout this essay. Nation-states that fail
to adjust their policies to multi-ethnic realities today will not be able to deal
effectively with the challenges of supranational integration and their
increasing impact on domestic politics of individual nation-states. Similarly,
trying to sustain policies based on unreconstructed, traditional, ethnically
and linguistically based notions of sovereignty and nation-state nationalism
will only lead to isolation and insularity with painful social and economic
consequences. These include the potential for civil strife and international
conflict, as the case of the former Yugoslavia has tragically demonstrated.
Adjustment might include, for example, domestic and inter-governmental
reforms of citizenship laws, immigration regulations, and anti-discrimination
legislation. As members of IGOs, nation-states are obligated to make a
concerted, collective effort to enhance the monitoring and implementation
of human-rights and other legal, political, and economic agreements in
countries in which violations of international law repeatedly take place
without rectification or remedy. These efforts must be further underpinned
by building out additional supranational institutions, including the still
controversial International Criminal Court and other global judicial organs.
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Nation-states and IGOs cannot meet the expanding needs of the unevenly
emerging, still embryonic supranational polity without also giving greater
priority to promoting the formation of a supranational civil society.  Here
the input, collaboration, and political upgrading of NGOs and their social-
movement constituencies at the domestic and supranational level are also
imperative. In order to facilitate such needed reform “from above,“ IGOs
and their member-states must provide NGOs and their grass-roots
constituencies, particularly in the developing world and newly independent
states, more favorable conditions in order that they can more effectively
provide development aid and inputs for economic stabilization, democratiza-
tion and human-rights implementation. Such work is necessary in order to
create viable and self-sustaining nation-states in the traditional modernist
sense and at the same time to integrate such states in the emerging post-
modernist, supranational global polity. The combination of these two partly
overlapping and partly conflicting projects will remain one of the daunting
reform challenges of the international community in the coming years.
In my analysis of nationalism in Part 2, I have tried to show that theories of
nationalism have considered the nation-state, nationalism and national
movements in an untenable isolation from their supranational environment
of IGOs, NGOs and other SNOs. This deficit reflects not only the
legitimate political weight and function of the nation-state but also its
undeconstructed, ideologically inflated self-importance in international
politics today. This deficiency in theories of nationalism tends to preclude a
clear analysis of the operation of the nation-state and nationalism in the
international system.
IGOs, NGOs, and other SNOs should be incorporated into the research
field of nationalism studies. It would then become possible for theorists of
nationalism to more fruitfully investigate the contradiction between
globalization and the decline of traditionally defined national sovereignty, on
the one hand, and the upsurge of self-determination nationalist movements
striving for nation-statehood, on the other. Such nationalist movements and
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the nation-states that result from them are increasingly co-determined in
their formation and development by their supranational context, namely,
IGOs, other IOs, and their member-states.
An additional problem in the theoretical analysis of nationalism is the
polarization of theorists who focus on modernization from those who adopt
an ethnic-nationalist approach. The modernization theories of nationalism
help us to understand the revolutionary socio-economic consequences of
past and present phases of capitalism’s on-going technological revolution.
But the critique of the modernization school of nationalism duly reminds us,
most acutely in the work of Anthony Smith, that, notwithstanding the
central place of economic and scientific progress, the latter cannot expunge
the ethnic components of traditional and new forms of nationalism. Indeed,
the post-modernist, multicultural transition of the nation-state and the
international system today, as discussed in the foregoing pages, suggests
that economic and technological change and its globalizing consequences
require greater cultural, ethnic, religious, and political pluralism than the
political culture characteristic of the traditional modern nation can
accommodate.  It is thus unlikely that globalization and international
economic integration can succeed without the building out of a suprana-
tional civil society based on globally functioning democratic, human-rights
based infrastructures.
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Abbreviations
BINGO Business International Non-Governmental Organization
COE Council of Europe
CSCE Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (renamed
OSCE)
EU European Union
IGO Intergovernmental Organization
IMF International Monetary Fund
INGO International Non-Governmental Organization
IO International Organization
MNC Multinational Corporation
MNE Multinational Enterprise
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NIS Newly Independent States
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
SNO Supranational Organization
SU Soviet Union
TNO Transnational Organization
UN United Nations
WB World Bank
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